Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets by Huang, Peter H
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
12-3-2003 
Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities 
Markets 
Peter H. Huang 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Huang, Peter H., "Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets " (2003). Faculty 
Scholarship at Penn Law. 13. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/13 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 




Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets 
  
Peter H. Huang* 
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................2 
I. IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE AND ANXIETY IN SECURITIES MARKETS .................................10 
A. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ......................................................................................................16 
1. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ...........................................................................................17 
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE INVOLVING SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS...............................18 
3. A CASE STUDY OF IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE: ON-LINE BROKERAGE ADS ..............20 
B. THEORETICAL MODELS ....................................................................................................26 
1. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY AND ANTICIPATORY FEELINGS .......27 
2. THE RISK-AS-FEELINGS HYPOTHESIS..........................................................................30 
3. THE “HOW-DO-I-FEEL-ABOUT-IT” HEURISTIC..........................................................32 
II. MANDATORY SECURITIES DISCLOSURES .............................................................................34 
III. CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................................43 
 
Abstract: This chapter analyzes the regulatory implications of irrational exuberance and anxiety 
in securities markets. U.S. federal securities laws mandate the disclosure of certain information, 
but regulate only the cognitive form and content of that information. An important and unstudied 
question is how to regulate securities markets where some investors respond not only cognitively 
to the form and content of information, but also emotionally to the form and content of 
information.  This chapter investigates that question when some investors feel exuberance or 
anxiety that is unjustified by cognitive processing of the available information. This chapter 
develops the implications for mandatory securities disclosure of irrational exuberance and 
anxiety.  
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Investing, especially by institutions, can increasingly take advantage of artificial 
intelligence, nonlinear chaotic models, genetic algorithms, neural network time series 
forecasting, pattern recognition software, and sophisticated quantitative computer valuation 
models.1  Thus, it seems that investing could become progressively more like the behavior 
described by the rational actor model of law and economics.  But, even for institutions, 
ultimately humans are responsible for investing and feel emotions during investing.  Yet, the 
rational actor model postulates that humans unemotionally maximize expected utility functions.2  
Behavioral economics advances an alternative to expected utility theory, namely prospect 
theory.3  The fact that Professor Kahneman was the co-recipient of the 2002 Nobel Prize in 
Economic Sciences to is the latest example of the ascendancy of behavioral economics.4 
Behavioral economics has gained much popularity and prestige in recent years.5  Recently, some 
legal scholars have applied behavioral economics to analyze legal rules and institutions.6 These 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Klepper, Kent Olson, Cathy Palombi, Barbie Selby, and Joseph J. Wynne for their extraordinary bibliographic 
assistance. 
1 See generally, PAUL WILMOTT, PAUL WILMOTT INTRODUCES QUANTITATIVE FINANCE (2001); PAUL WILMOTT, 
PAUL WILMOTT ON QUANTITATIVE FINANCE (2000). 
2 Matthew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein, & Peter H. Huang, Introduction to Symposium, Preferences and Rational 
Choice: New Perspectives and Legal Implications, 151 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).  See generally JOHN VON 
NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1947). 
3 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 
263 (1979) (introducing prospect theory).  See also Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference and the Law, __ 
NW. U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2003) (surveying applications of prospect theory to law). 
4 Jon E. Hilsenrath, Nobel Winners for Economics Are New Breed, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2002 at B1 (explaining that 
“Kahneman pioneered the field of behavioral economics”). 
5 George A. Akerlof, Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 411, 424-428 
(2002) (arguing in a revised version of the lecture he presented upon receiving the 2001 Nobel Prize in economic 
sciences (Dec. 8, 2001) that macroeconomics should be behavioral and that JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL 
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936) is the “progenitor of the modern behavioral finance view 
of asset markets”); Roger Loewenstein, Exuberance is Rational Or At Least Human, NY TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001 § 6 
(Magazine), at 66-71 (reporting on Richard Thaler’s pioneering contributions to behavioral economics); Louis 
Uchitelle, Following the Money, but Also the Mind: Some Economists Call Behavior a Key, NY TIMES, Feb. 11, 
2001 § 3 (Money & Business), at 1, 11 (reporting on the hiring by the economics departments of Harvard University 
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology of young behavioral economists). 
6 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 
(1998) (providing a novel behavioral economics justification for using legal rules to redistribute income); Christine 




legal scholars consider the policy and regulatory implications of cognitive limitations by drawing 
on a literature about information processing errors.7  But, the scope and normative implications 
of such legal applications remains the subject of continuing debate.8   
In addition, while prospect theory provides an alternative model of choice under risk to 
expected utility theory; prospect theory, expected utility theory, and “virtually all current theories 
of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist.”9  But, human behavior is 
not only cognitive, but also emotional;10 moreover, cognition and emotion are interrelated.11  For 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (offering a survey of the 
insights of behavioral economics for the analysis of legal rules and institutions).  See generally Symposium, 
Research Conference on Behavioral Law and Economics in the Workplace, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
7 See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market 
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 640-93 (1999) (providing an overview of behavioral research); Barton L. 
Lipman, Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey, 28 CANADIAN J. ECON. 42 (2000) (surveying 
theoretical models of bounded rationality due to limitations in the ability of humans to process information). 
8 See Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765 
(1998) (noting the lack of a general theory of behavioral law and economics); GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE 
THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD (2000) (rethinking rationality as adaptive thinking); GERD 
GIGERENZER ET AL, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999) (demonstrating that fast and simple 
procedures for making decisions possess ecological rationality); Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: 
A Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 266-386 (arguing that cognitive 
psychology supports adopting enterprise liability for product-related torts); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 218-58 (2000) (arguing that cognitive psychology does not support adopting enterprise 
liability for product-related torts); Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: 
The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 738 (2000) (recommending that judges and scholars 
use caution in applying behavioral decision theory to legal analysis); Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a 
Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729 (1998) (providing a critical assessment of behavioral law 
and economics); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for 
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (criticizing behavioral law and 
economics for overlooking substantial empirical evidence on individual and situational variability in the rationality 
of behavior).  But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The 'New' Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and 
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000) (defending behavioral law and economics); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, The Uneasy Psychological Case for Paternalism (Fall 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
author) (arguing that legal scholarship mistakes the principal message of cognitive psychology to be that people 
make systematic decision-making errors instead of that people develop complex, contextual strategies for making 
choices). 
9 George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk-as-Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001). 
10 See generally Colin Camerer, et al., Gray Matters: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming, 2003); Colin Camerer & George F. Loewenstein,  Behavioral Economics: Past, 
Present, and Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin Camerer, et al. eds., forthcoming, 2003); 
George F. Loewenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Affect in Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE 
SCIENCE 619 (Richard J. Davidson ed., et al., 2003). 
11 See, e.g., Louis C. Charland, Is Mr. Spock Mentally Competent? Competence to Consent and Emotion, 5 PHIL, 
PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 67, 71-72 (1998) (describing recent neurophysiological, philosophical, and psychological 
research suggesting that emotions are fundamentally cognitive); Yaniv Hanoch, “Neither An Angel Nor An Ant”: 




example, investors may be overconfident due to hubris.  Yet, “research from clinical, 
physiological, and other subfields of psychology, … show that emotional reactions to risky 
situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks.  When such divergence 
occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior.”12 
 Behavioral finance, which is behavioral economics over time and under conditions of 
risk, has revolutionized academic finance.13 But, while behavioral finance sometimes refers to 
such emotions as greed and fear, behavioral finance only considers emotions to explain why 
some investors utilize cognitive biases and heuristics.14  The main focus of behavioral finance is 
to demonstrate how investing driven by cognitive limitations explains observed anomalies in 
asset pricing and impacts asset pricing.15   
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Emotion As An Aid To Bounded Rationality, 23 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (2002) (arguing that emotions assist people 
in processing information); J. MARK G. WILLIAMS, ET AL., COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND EMOTIONAL DISORDERS 2-
4 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the relationship between cognition and emotion). 
12 Loewenstein, supra note 9 at .267. 
13 Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 83, 90-91 
(2003) (discussing how academic finance has evolved from widespread acceptance of the so-called efficient markets 
hypothesis to behavioral finance becoming one of its most vital research programs).  See generally Werner F.M. De 
Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Financial Decision-Making in Markets and Firms: A Behavioral Perspective, in  9 
FINANCE 385-410 (Robert A. Jarrow, et al. eds., 1995); I-IV HERSH SHEFRIN, BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (THE 
INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF CRITICAL WRITINGS IN FINANCIAL ECONOMICS) (2001); RICHARD H. THALER, 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE II (2003). 
14 JOHN R. NOFSINGER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INVESTING xi (2002) (stating that “[a]n old Wall Street adage states 
that two factors move the market: fear and greed.  Although true, this characterization is far too simplistic.  The 
human mind is very sophisticated, and human emotions are very complex.  The emotions of fear and greed just don’t 
adequately describe the psychology that affects people.”); HERSH M. SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: 
UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000) (providing a guide for 
financial practitioners to behavioral finance). 
15 See, e.g., Nick Barberis et al., Prospect Theory and Asset Prices, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2001) (proposing a stock 
return model that is consistent with experimental evidence and prospect theory); Nick Barberis & Richard H. Thaler, 
A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE (George Constantinides, et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2003) (reviewing and evaluating recent work in behavioral finance); Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. 
Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle, 110 Q. J. ECON. 73 (1995) (providing and testing a 
psychological model based on loss aversion and myopia in the sense of the tendency of investors to frequently 
evaluate their portfolios even if those are held over a long time period; their model explains an empirical fact known 
as the equity premium that over the last century, stocks have outperformed bonds by a very large margin); Kent D. 
Daniel et al., Investor Psychology in Capital Markets: Evidence and Policy Implications (Aug. 3, 2001) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (reviewing extensive empirical evidence about how psychological 
biases affect investor behavior and capital market prices); David A. Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset 
Prices, 56 J. FIN. 1533 (2001) (surveying recent models of investor psychology affecting asset prices); JOHN R. 
NOFSINGER, INVESTMENT BLUNDERS OF THE RICH AND FAMOUS … AND WHAT YOU CAN LEARN FROM THEM 13-28 
(2002) (reviewing behavioral finance literature on psychological biases and resulting investment blunders). 




 For example, many individuals and even some financial practitioners over-react to 
information as well as to what they believe others will do.16  Some behavioral finance models 
assume there are noise traders, who are unable to differentiate between payoff-irrelevant 
information (that is, noise) and payoff-relevant information, due usually to cognitive biases in 
processing information.17  Recently, scholars have begun to consider the implications of 
cognitive biases for securities regulation.18  This chapter builds upon such legal scholarship that 
focuses primarily on cognitive biases and heuristics by focusing instead on emotional investing.     
 Most U.S. federal securities laws focus on the cognitive form and content of certain 
information.19  In contrast, many investors respond emotionally to both the form and content of 
information and while investing, experience a series of “successive emotional states of hope, joy, 
craving and euphoria,”20 sometimes followed by anxiety and fear.  It is thus not surprising that a 
moment of introspection reveals that people usually feel many emotions before, during, and after 
they invest.  In fact, certain emotions might exemplify visceral factors that short circuit or trump 
                                                          
16 Kent D. Daniel et al., Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- and Over- Reactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839 
(1998). 
17 See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 33-46 (2000) 
(defining noise traders and presenting a model of how the risk presented by noise traders limits arbitrage). 
18 Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) 
(arguing for a series of presumptions against interventions by such behaviorally-flawed regulators as the SEC); 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 786-837 
(2002)  (explaining the policy implications for corporate governance of behavioral finance); Leslie Hodder et al., 
SEC Market Risk Disclosures: Implications for Judgment and Decision Making, 15 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 49 
(2001) (drawing on insights from cognitive psychology to examine the implications of the SEC’s Financial 
Reporting Release No. 48 about derivative and market risk disclosures); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal 
Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002) 
(discussing implications of four cognitive biases of investors for three areas of securities regulation); Robert 
Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 
DUKE L.J. 1397, 1410-1510 (2002) (discussing behavioral reasons to question recently proposed securities 
deregulation); Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation in an Electronic Age: The Impact of Cognitive 
Psychology, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 779-89 (1997) (discussing analysis of securities regulation utilizing insights 
from neo-classical economics based on expected utility model versus insights from behavioral economics based 
upon cognitive psychology). 
19 See, e.g., A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corporation, 312 U.S. 38, 43, n.2 (1941) (stating that the 
fundamental purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors by mandating full disclosure of the information that 
is thought necessary for investors to make informed investment decisions); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing 
Equipment Corp., 332 F.Supp. 544, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating “that without complete, accurate and intelligible 
information about a company, investors cannot make intelligent investment decisions with regard to its securities”). 




normal logical reasoning.21  For example, an investor feeling exuberant may optimistically 
misperceive or even ignore completely the risk factors associated with a particular security 
during her investment decision process.  Similarly, an investor who feels anxious over a string of 
accounting scandals and instances of corporate malfeasance may pessimistically misperceive or 
even ignore completely any sound fundamentals associated with a particular security during her 
investment decision process.  This chapter analyzes the regulatory implications of irrational 
exuberance and anxiety in securities markets.  
People usually answer the question, “what is emotion?” with these synonyms: affect, 
feelings, or mood.22   Even today, the precise definition of an emotion remains contested among 
researchers.23  But, there is a consensus that emotions involve a number of related characteristics, 
namely great intensity, instability, relative brevity, and a partial perspective.24  Before 
proceeding further, it helps to distinguish among these three related but distinct concepts: 
emotions, affect, and mood.  Emotions describe particular states, like fear, anger, or happiness, 
that are “intense, short-lived, and usually have a definite cause and clear cognitive content.”25  
Affect refers to “a feeling state that people experience, such as happiness or sadness.  It may also 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
20 JOACHIM GOLDBERG & RUDIGER VON NITZSCH, BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 19 (Adriana Morris, trans., 2001) (1999). 
21 JON ELSTER, STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDICTION, AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 154-65 (1999) (noting the 
similarities between research on addiction and that about emotions); George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral 
Influences on Behavior, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISON PROCESSES 272, 288 (1996) (explaining how visceral 
factors such as certain emotions can lead human behavior to deviate from perceived self-interest); George 
Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 426, 426-31 (2000) 
(defining visceral factors including negative emotions as state-dependent preferences and explaining their 
significance, effects and consequences for economic behavior).  See also Robert S. Adler et al., Emotions in 
Negotiation: How to Manage Fear and Anger, Apr. NEGOTIATION J. 161, 168-74 (1998) (arguing that such 
emotions as fear and anger can disrupt normal rational thinking and reasoning abilities). 
22 ANTONIO DAMASIO, LOOKING FOR SPINOZA: JOY, SORROW, AND THE FEELING BRAIN 27-80 (2003) (arguing that 
emotions differ from mood and precede feelings). 
23 DYLAN EVANS, EMOTION: THE SCIENCE OF SENTIMENT 148 (2001). 
24 AARON BEN-ZE’EV, THE SUBTLETY OF EMOTIONS 13 (2000). 
25 Joseph P. Forgas, Affect in Social Judgments and Decisions: A Multiprocess Model, in ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 227, 230 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992). 




be viewed as a quality (e.g. goodness or badness) associated with a stimulus.”26  Mood refers to 
“a feeling (such as having the blues) that is low in intensity, can last for a few minutes or several 
weeks, has no object or has fleeting objects, and does not have to have a specific antecedent 
cause or cognitive content.”27  Scholars often describe the stock market as experiencing (bipolar) 
mood swings.28  There is experimental evidence that happy and sad moods have large and 
consistent effects on estimating subjective probabilities of positive and negative events.29  
There are (at least) two principal alternative ways to conceive of emotions.  First, there is 
a tradition dating back to Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato that conceives of emotions as factors that 
disturb rational deliberation, thought, and reflection.30  Second, there is a more recent view 
informed by cognitive neuroscience that conceives of emotions as factors that complement 
rationality in effective decision-making.31  Naturally, these different conceptions of emotions 
have diametrically opposed implications for whether and if so, how the law can or should 
respond to emotional human behavior.  The first viewpoint implies that law should be designed 
to protect us from our emotions,32 while the second viewpoint implies that law should take a 
more laissez faire attitude towards our emotions.   
                                                          
26 Melissa L. Finucane, et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION 
MAKING 1, 2 n.1 (2000). 
27 Melissa L. Finucane, et al., Judgment and Decision Making: The Dance of Affect and Reason, in EMERGING 
PERSPECTIVES ON DECISION RESEARCH (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., forthcoming). 
28 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, OUTSMARTING THE SMART MONEY: UNDERSTAND HOW MARKETS 
REALLY WORK AND WIN THE WEALTH GAME 59 (2002) (noting that “astute investors such as [Benjamin] Graham 
recognized the moodiness of the market”); LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, HOW TO THINK LIKE BENJAMIN GRAHAM 
AND INVEST LIKE WARREN BUFFET 3 (2001) (describing the stock market in terms of a “patient exhibit[ing] classic 
manic depression – or bipolar disorder – combining episodes of euphoria with irritation”); Langevoort, supra note 
18, at 181 (“significant mood swings in stock prices”). 
29 William F. Wright & Gordon H. Bower, Mood Effects on Subjective Probability Assessment, 52 ORG. BEHAV. & 
HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES  276, 280-88 (1992) (documenting such mood effects). 
30 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 146 (Ernest Baker trans. 1946) (stating that “[l]aw … may be 
defined as ‘Reason free from all passion.’”) 
31 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 547-53 (2d ed., 
2002) (describing recent research on the positive role that emotions can play in decision-making). 
32 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (“Where a majority is 
included in a faction, the form of popular government . . . enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both 
the public good and the rights of other citizens.”). 




Asking whether emotional decision-making is socially desirable is akin to asking whether 
self-interested decision-making is socially desirable.  Under certain strong conditions, including 
but not limited to complete markets and perfect competition, the pursuit of self-interest can lead 
to socially desirable results in the sense of Pareto efficient outcomes.  In other situations, 
including but not limited to the presence of externalities or public goods and in certain strategic 
interactions, the pursuit of self-interest can lead to socially undesirable results in the sense of 
Pareto inefficient outcomes. 
Existing legal doctrines provide numerous examples of both conceptions of emotions.  
Criminal law considers excuses based upon extreme emotional disturbance, the battered woman 
syndrome, and post-traumatic stress disorder; but it also encourages compassion, mercy, and 
sympathy.  Tort law recognizes some, but not all forms of emotional harm and suffering.  
Contract law recognizes the formation defense of procedural unconscionability, which can be 
due to distress, transactional incapacity, or unfair persuasion.33  The Federal Trade Commission 
promulgated a rule granting consumers a three day “cooling-off period” during which buyers can 
rescind their contracts with door-to-door salespeople.34  There is a similar three day cooling-off 
period for home equity loans providing buyers with a limited right to rescind certain credit 
transactions involving their principal dwelling as a security interest.35  Congress imposed a seven 
day waiting period on any employee waiver of rights under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA).36  The family law statutes of many states require that (perhaps very 
                                                          
33 See, e.g., generally Melvin Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982) 
(providing a unifying explication of the doctrine of procedural unconsionability). 
34 See FTC Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period Made for Sales at Homes or at Certain Other Locations, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 429.1(a) (2002) (mandating that a contract’s front page state that the buyer “may cancel this transaction at any 
time prior to midnight of the third business day”). 
35 See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2000) (granting borrowers the right to cancel any consumer credit transaction involving 
their principal dwelling as a security interest before midnight of the third business day after the completion of the 
contract). 
36 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(G) (2000) (mandating that an agreement to waive one’s rights may be revoked up to 
seven days after its inception). 




“yippy skippy”) couples must wait awhile after the issuance of a marriage certificate before they 
can marry.37  Some of these states also require that a couple may not divorce until after the 
passage of a mandatory waiting period, that usually exceeds the mandatory prenuptial waiting 
period.38           
Asking whether emotions are good or bad for decision-making is analogous to asking if 
heuristics are good or bad for decision-making.  Sometimes emotions are good for making 
decisions, while at other times emotions are bad for making decisions; just as sometimes 
heuristics are good for making decisions, while at other times heuristics are bad for making 
decisions.  The reason for this mixed or nuanced answer is the same in the case of both emotions 
and heuristics, namely emotions and heuristics act faster than rational deliberation, but precisely 
because of their speed, emotions and heuristics can mislead us into systematic errors in making 
decisions.   
 This chapter focuses on emotions before or during investing, and therefore complements 
my previous work on anticipated emotions, which are fully and correctly anticipated before or 
during the decision making process.39  A difficulty with anticipated emotions is that people may 
                                                          
37 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13-b (McKinney 1999) (“A marriage shall not be solemnized within twenty-four 
hours after the issuance of the marriage license . . . .”). 
38 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-67(a) (West 1995) (mandating that married couples must wait ninety 
days after filing a complaint for dissolution or legal separation before the court may proceed). 
39 Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (forthcoming 2003) 
(demonstrating analytically how guilt can mitigate opportunistic behavior by broker-dealers and other corporate 
actors); Peter H. Huang, International Environmental Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S237 (2002) (demonstrating formally how fear of losing face can induce compliance with international 
environmental law); Peter H. Huang, Reasons within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights 
Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435 (2000) (analyzing the impact of anger and shame in Coasian bargaining); Peter H. 
Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 639 (1999) (considering emotions that may 
occur when utilizing markets to allocate reproductive technologies and genetic engineering); Peter H. Huang, 
Dangers of Monetary Incommensurability: A Psychological Game Model of Contagion, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1701 
(1998) (discussing emotions that arise from commodification and monetary commensurability); Peter H. Huang & 
Ho-Mou Wu, More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994) (explaining how guilt may sustain the honoring of trust in principal-agent relationships); 
Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 31 (1992) 
(considering how emotions influence decisions to sue, settle, or proceed to trial). 




systematically make prediction errors regarding their future interim or ex post feelings.40  
Because irrational exuberance and anxiety occur before or during the process of decision 
making, there are no such difficulties with irrational exuberance and anxiety.   
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Part I provides empirical and 
experimental evidence of, a case study of, and theoretical models of irrational exuberance and 
anxiety in securities markets. Part II contributes to the debate over mandatory securities 
disclosures by examining the implications of irrational exuberance and anxiety for such 
disclosures.  Part II also develops implications of the fact that securities regulators, including but 
not limited to the SEC, juries, and private litigants themselves experience irrational exuberance 
and anxiety.  Part III provides conclusions. 
I. IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE AND ANXIETY IN SECURITIES MARKETS 
  
 The chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D.C., Alan Greenspan, 
described stock market investor behavior with the phrase “irrational exuberance” in his now 
infamous December 5, 1996 speech.  Those two words resonated with many commentators in the 
                                                          
40 George Loewenstein, et al., The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual Forcefulness, 34 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 445-47 (1997) (applying empathy gap to a rational choice model of crime by testing how 
young males in various states of sexual arousal predict how coercive they will be in sexual settings); George 
Loewenstein, et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility (Univ. of Calif. Berkeley Dept. of Econ., Working 
Paper No. E00-284) (unpublished manuscript, Mar. 21, 2000) (presenting evidence of and a formal model of people 
underappreciating how their own behavior and exogenous influences affect their future utility); George Loewenstein 
& David Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85, 88-100 (1999) (reviewing empirical findings of such misprediction, discussing the 
sources of such errors, and considering policy implications); Leaf Van Boven & George Loewenstein, Social 
Projection of Transient Visceral Feelings, PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. (forthcoming, 2003) (discussing 
the effects of hot-cold empathy gaps of having difficulty imagining oneself while in a hot state to be in a cold state);.  
See also Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 292, 297-312 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (discussing experimental 
evidence that people misestimate the duration of their future feelings); Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A 
Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 620-36 (1998) (same); 
Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, 
in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION 178, 185-94 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000) 
(discussing these findings).  




media and with the public worldwide.  The publication of a book entitled Irrational Exuberance 
cemented the permanence of that phrase in the popular lexicon about securities markets.41  What 
exactly, though, does irrational exuberance mean, as opposed to rational exuberance or irrational 
anxiety?  In this chapter, the phrase irrational exuberance refers to exuberance that is not justified 
by merely cognitive processing of the available information about securities markets. Thus, 
rational exuberance refers to exuberance that is warranted by merely cognitive processing of 
securities disclosures and risks.  Irrational anxiety refers to anxiety that is unwarranted by merely 
cognitive analyses of securities markets fundamentals.  Rational anxiety refers to anxiety that is 
supported by merely cognitive assessments of the costs and benefits of securities investing. 
 Most people at some point during investing experience fear or hope over their 
investments.  People often make investments motivated by fears.  There is the fear of losing 
money.42  There is the fear of not keeping up with others or being left out of a bull market.43  The 
fear of regret also partially explains why investors often select conventional stock choices, use 
full-commission brokers rather than discount brokers (the former may give useless advice, but 
also provide easy scapegoats), and hold onto losing stocks too long.44 People often avoid 
purchasing such volatile securities as those of biotech or Internet companies to minimize 
anxiety.45  On the other hand, some investors, such as day traders, might engage in risky 
                                                          
41 ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000). 
42 The robust experimental findings that people can be very loss averse and treat out-of-pocket losses differently 
than opportunity costs have clear implications for the way that people actually invest.   
43 Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When, and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 379 (1995) (reviewing evidence of a temporal pattern to regret). 
44 Hersh M. Shefrin & Meir Statman, How Not to Make Money in the Stock Market, PSYCHOL. TODAY Feb. 1986, at 
52, 56-57 (providing these explanations); SHEFRIN, supra note 14, at 222-224 (discussing the roles of regret and 
responsibility in active versus passive money management). 
45 It is crucial to distinguish anxiety from risk aversion.  Anxiety is a dynamic notion that arises because some 
decision-makers may prefer to not live with a feeling of uncertainty across time periods.  Risk aversion is a static 
notion related to how curved a decision-maker’s utility function over wealth is within a fixed period of time.  See 
Elke U. Weber & Christopher Hsee, Cross-Cultural Differences in Risk Perception, but Cross-Cultural Similarities 
in Attitudes Towards Perceived Risk, 44 MGMT. SCI. 1205 (1998) (reporting that respondents in the U. S., Germany, 
the P.R.C., and Poland differed in their risk preferences, but are similar in their attitudes towards perceived risk). 




portfolio strategies partly for their excitement.  One legal scholar likens euphoric financial 
market transactions to gambling.46  That same legal scholar believes that laws may reduce the 
irrational exuberance of securities markets.47  Arguably, certain policies of the SEC and the 
Federal Reserve facilitate investor enthusiasm about stocks.48  Not only financial rewards, but 
also excitement and general optimism often motivate the issuers of securities, original investors 
in initial public offerings (IPOs),49 and subsequent early investors.  
 Irrational exuberance and anxiety raise a couple of questions, namely how and why does 
irrational exuberance and anxiety persist in light of so-called learning effects and selection 
effects.  Learning effects occur if people learn from their own personal investing experience or 
those of others and get better at investing over time, as they discover that relying on irrational 
exuberance and anxiety can yield investment returns that they subsequently realize are 
financially suboptimal.  As with Bill Murray’s character, Phil, in the movie Groundhog Day, 
noiseless feedback and stationary environments promote learning effects.50  But, investing yields 
very noisy feedback because people can quite naturally (and perhaps even subconsciously) 
confuse their investment successes with financial insight and confuse their investment failures 
with bad luck.  In addition, empirical evidence suggests that securities markets are highly non-
stationary environments.  It might seem that institutional and organizational structures can foster 
                                                          
46 Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the Regulation of Euphoric 
Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 227 (2001).  
47 Id. at 278-84 (identifying specific regulatory methods for mitigating irrational exuberance in securities markets); 
Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Role of Law in Managing Market Moods: The Whole Story of Jason Who Bought High, 
69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111, 123-34 (2000) (reviewing ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000)) 
(making specific legal proposals for mitigating irrational exuberance in securities markets). 
48 Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 837-84 
(2000) (arguing that the SEC and the Fed have contributed to investors' optimism about stocks and suggesting how 
to remedy that situation). 
49 The original investors in IPOs are typically not individual investors, but institutional investors.  See Hillary A. 
Sale, Disappearing without A Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1833 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 
441 (2000) (observing that the class of “first buyers of the securities issued (Original Shareholders)…is usually very 
limited, including only institutional investors, members of Congress, and those with connections to underwriters.”) 
50 GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures Corporation 1993). 




learning effects and thus dampen irrational exuberance and anxiety in a manner analogous to 
how framing dampens endowment effects in corporate agency contexts.51  But, irrational 
exuberance and anxiety are not really biases to be unlearned.       
 Selection effects occur if securities market pressures weed out irrational exuberance and 
anxiety. Even when some investors continue to feel irrational exuberance and anxiety over time, 
perhaps the overall impact of irrational exuberance and anxiety on securities markets will 
decrease over time due to arbitrage.  It might seem that arbitrage is a powerful force that selects 
for (more) rational investing decision-making and weeds out irrational exuberance and anxiety.  
But, as is well-known by now, there are costs and limits to arbitrage.52  Also, arbitrage is a strong 
engine of information transfer that travels in two directions.  In other words, just as those 
investors who do not feel irrational exuberance and anxiety can arbitrage away the impact of 
those investors who do feel irrational exuberance and anxiety, similarly those investors who feel 
irrational exuberance and anxiety can arbitrage away the impact of those investors who do not 
feel irrational exuberance and anxiety.  The often cited observation that securities markets are the 
archetypical model of perfectly competitive markets is a true, but moot point if even institutional, 
professional, or sophisticated investors also feel irrational exuberance and anxiety.  In fact, there 
is anthropological, economic, ethnographic, and sociological evidence that documents how the 
corporate cultures of many institutional investors foster irrational exuberance and anxiety.53  
Finally, recent empirical evidence finds that securities market professionals feel the same 
                                                          
51 Jennifer Arlen, et al., Endowment Effects with Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002) 
(finding that the endowment effect is significantly dampened in experimental agency contexts). 
52 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1997) (proving this formally). 
53 See, e.g., generally MITCHEL Y. ABOLAFIA, MAKING MARKETS: OPPORTUNISM AND RESTRAINT ON WALL STREET 
(1996) (providing such evidence). 




emotions as individual investors do.54  Finally, there is anecdotal evidence that even institutional 
investors feel strong emotions over their investments.55 
 Although securities markets are highly competitive, valuation in securities markets is an 
extremely subjective process.  Emotional factors often influence the assessment of securities 
values across investors, just as emotions often affect subjective appraisals of the value of 
residential properties across home-buyers and homeowners.  In fact, because securities, unlike 
consumer durables and real estate, are never consumed; securities markets, even more than other 
durable goods markets, involve subjective, often ephemeral and potentially very emotional 
anticipations of the future.  While reasonable people may agree on the past and the present 
(although there is reason to be skeptical of even these propositions as evidenced by the well-
known fallibility of eyewitness testimony and memory), reasonable people often disagree on the 
future, both in terms of the set of contemplated outcomes and their various relative likelihoods.  
People are repeatedly caught off guard upon the realization of previously subjectively unforeseen 
contingencies.    
 Even before the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act in 1934 were 
enacted, and certainly ever since then, it would not be surprising to note that many emotional 
factors affect investor behavior.  The legislative history of both Acts that are the centerpiece of 
U.S. federal securities regulation contains numerous horror stories.  Many of the cognitive 
psychological insights of behavioral finance were already an accepted part of the folk-wisdom 
that formed the basis and rationale for our federal system of securities regulation.  U.S. securities 
laws can be understood as an attempt to alter the manner in which investors make decisions by 
                                                          
54 Andrew W. Lo & Dmitry V. Repin, The Psychophysiology of Real-Time Financial Risk Processing, National 
Bureau Econ. Res. Working Paper No. W8508 (unpublished manuscript, Oct. 2001) (providing such evidence). 
55 See, e.g., ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT 75 (2000) (observing that “Long-Term’s traders were not automatons.  They debated, sometimes 




helping, or forcing, them to make better decisions.  For example, the Securities Act of 1933 goes 
to extremely great lengths to try to structure the investment process/decision into a hyper-rational 
process in which a reasonable investor, sitting in the calm of her study, reviews only the 
prospectus of the registration statement, without being influenced unduly by pushy stockbrokers, 
high-pressure scare tactics, glossy ads or promotional materials, or anything else.  The puffery 
defense attempts to minimize the distortions that can be caused by puffery by placing investors 
on legal notice that they should ignore puffery, assuming that they can do so.  The quiet period; 
the prohibitions against “conditioning” securities markets by engaging in so-called “gun-
jumping” during the period before the filing of a registration statement with the SEC;56 and the 
mandatory disclosures required of a securities registration statement are all designed to improve 
investor decision-making by limiting the influence of distortions on the rational investment 
process.   
 But, in light of not only the persistence of, but also the recent growth in irrational 
exuberance and anxiety, existing federal securities regulations have clearly failed to sufficiently 
protect investors from their emotional selves or from emotional others.  This chapter thus 
critiques our current federal securities laws on two accounts.  First, U.S. federal securities laws 
fail to incorporate the best model of decision-making, namely one that incorporates the realities 
and robustness of human emotions.  Second, U.S. federal securities laws fail to incorporate the 
best techniques for teaching investors how to improve their decision-making skills, e.g., the law 
should be teaching investors to make decisions based on different factors, such as, more forward-
looking, rather than backward-looking, information. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
hotly, for hours every week, about what the models implied and whether to do what the models recommended.” 
Italics in original). 




 The rest of this section of the chapter analyzes the recent experimental and empirical 
evidence of and theoretical models about irrational exuberance and anxiety in securities markets.  
A recent, comprehensive synthesis of the research on how feelings influence stock pricing also 
suggests future directions of research, proposes richer hypotheses, and raises open questions 
about how investors’ feelings impact securities prices.57 
A. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
An important finding of research on the perception of risk is that “[r]isk is multi-attribute 
in nature.  It involves such elements as feelings of control, dread, and knowledge. … Risk always 
contains an emotional or affective dimension.”58  Investing is clearly risky.  Survey evidence 
indicates that such emotional factors as catastrophic potential, control, and dread figure 
prominently in the perception of financial risks,59 and that “emotional dimensions such as dread 
are important in the perceived risk of financial gambles.”60  Studies demonstrate that moods 
induced by reading brief newspaper stories reporting on tragic or happy incidents produce large 
and pervasive changes in estimates on the frequency of risks, independent of whether the stories 
and risks are similar.61  Evidence of the prevalence of affect in forming risk perceptions occurs in 
many diverse settings.62    
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
56 See Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in Registration, SEC Release No. 
5180, 1 Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) at 3056 (Aug. 16, 1971) (detailing the rationales for prohibiting gun-jumping in 
terms of curbing the practice of conditioning of securities markets). 
57 Michael Dowling & Brian M. Lucey, The Role of Feelings in Investor Decision-Making (Jan. 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author) (synthesizing empirical research on the impact of emotions on stock prices and 
developing a theoretical basis for understanding that empirical research). 
58 Robert A. Olsen, Behavioral Finance as Science: Implications from the Research of Paul Slovic, 2 J. PSYCHOL. & 
FIN. MARKETS 157, 159 (2001). 
59 David R. Holtgrave & Elke U. Weber, Dimensions of Risk Perception for Financial and Health Risks, 13  RISK 
ANALYSIS 553, 556-58 (1993). 
60 Id. at 558. 
61 Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky, Affect, Generalization, and the Perception of Risk, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 20, 23-30 (1983). 
62 PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, xxxii, 278-80, 331-38 (2000) (providing such evidence). 




Emotional investing exemplifies Professor Damasio’s theory of the role of emotion in 
decision-making.63  Professor Damasio believes that “[t]he factual knowledge required for 
reasoning and decision making comes to the mind in the form of images.”64 Professor Damasio’s 
somatic marker hypothesis is that with experience, these images become “marked” by positive 
and negative feelings linked directly or indirectly to somatic or bodily states.65 Professor 
Damasio’s research documents clinical evidence of patients with damage to the ventromedial 
frontal cortices of their brains having trouble feeling emotions, associating those feelings with 
the anticipated consequences of their actions, and making decisions in spite of retaining their 
basic intelligence, memory, and capabilities for analytical reasoning and for logical thought.66  
Neurobiological and psychological research demonstrates that people recall new facts better if 
certain emotions are present during learning than if they are not.67  The rest of this section of the 
chapter analyzes the empirical evidence of emotional investing in experiments, by securities 
professionals, and in response to on-line brokerage ads. 
1. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE  
 
The fact that Professor Smith was the co-recipient of the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic 
Sciences to is the latest example of the ascendancy of experimental economics.68  There is both 
an increasing appreciation for and application of empirical and experimental methodology to 
                                                          
63 ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994). 
64 Id. at 96. 
65 Id. at 173-75, 179-80. 
66 Id. at 53-54; Antonio R. Damasio et al., Individuals with Sociopathic Behavior Caused by Frontal Damage Fail to 
Respond Autonomically to Social Stimuli, 41 BEHAV. BRAIN RES. 81 (1990). 
67 ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 294 (1999) (discussing this experimental evidence); Alan M. Lerner, Using Our Brains: What 
Cognitive Science Tells Us About Teaching Problem Solving and Professional Responsibility, CLINICAL L. REV.  
(forthcoming) (discussing the implications of emotion and recall for experiential teaching of ethical and moral 
judgment in law school). 
68 Hilsenrath, supra note 4. 




study legal rules and institutions.69  A particular laboratory experiment investigated the behavior 
of investors when they face what is known as global risk, namely a risk independent of their 
decisions.70  Political risk that is not country specific is an example of global risk.  The study 
found that global risk significantly and substantially decreases average investment.  This finding 
is not consistent with such theories of rational decision making in the presence of risk as 
expected utility theory,71 prospect theory,72 disappointment theory, 73 and regret theory.74  This 
experimental result is consistent with psychological evidence that anxious people make 
pessimistic probability estimates, are biased in terms of the amounts and types of information 
they utilize, and are thus motivated to reduce the level of risks they face.75    
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE INVOLVING SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS 
 
 A recent study of professional derivative securities traders documents the importance of 
emotional responses in their decision-making processes.76  The study measured physiological 
characteristics, such as body temperature, cardiovascular data, electromyographical signals, 
respiration rate, and skin conductance response, during actual trading sessions.  The study found 
                                                          
69 Symposium, Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV 791 (2002). 
70 Ronald Bosman & Frans van Winden, Global Risk, Effort, and Emotions in an Investment Experiment (Aug. 
2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (reporting this finding). 
71 VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 2. 
72 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 3.  
73 David E. Bell, Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 33 OPERATIONS RES.  1 (1985). 
74 Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty, 
92 ECON. THEORY 805 (1982). 
75 Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 146, 147-51 
(2001) (finding that anxious and fearful people made pessimistic risk estimates and favor cautious, risk-averse 
behavior); Rajagopal Raghunathan & Michel Tuan Pham, All Negative Moods Are Not Equal: Motivational 
Influences of Anxiety and Sadness on Decision Making, 79 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISON PROCESSES 56, 63-65 
(1999) (finding that anxious individuals are biased towards low risk and low reward gambles because anxiety primes 
an implicit goal of uncertainty reduction); Larissa Z. Tiedens & Susan Linton, Judgment Under Emotional Certainty 
and Uncertainty: The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
973, 978-81 (2001) (finding that fearful people utilized stereotypes in making social judgments less than disgusted 
people); Larissa Z. Tiedens & Susan Linton, Judgment Under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of 
Specific Emotions on Information Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 973 (2001) (providing 
experimental evidence that emotions associated with certainty promote heuristic processing, while emotions 
associated with uncertainty promote systematic processing).  




significant correlation between electrodermal responses and transient market events, and 
between changes in cardiovascular variables and market volatility.  These data suggest that an 
important factor in the success of some derivative securities traders is their ability to utilize their 
emotions to make very rapid trading decisions.  In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that even 
professional traders react emotionally to financial decisions, information, and outcomes.77  
 A number of empirical studies document a statistically significant effect of weather on 
stock market prices.78  For example, local cloud cover in New York City from 1927-89 was 
significantly correlated with low daily returns on three U.S. stock indices (the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, a New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) / American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
equal-weighted index, and a NYSE/AMEX value-weighted index).79  In fact, there was a strong 
positive correlation between morning sunshine at a country's leading stock exchange and the 
market index stock returns that day at twenty-six stock exchanges internationally from 1982-
97.80  In addition, seasonal variations in biorhythms and disruptions in sleep caused by changing 
from and to daylight savings affect stock returns internationally.81  Furthermore, returns on 
international stock exchanges are correlated with fluctuations in the amount of daylight over the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
76 Lo & Repin, supra note 54. 
77 See MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER 15 (1989), “He had, I think, a profound ability to control the two emotions 
that commonly destroy traders – fear and greed – and it made him as noble as a man who pursues his self-interest so 
fiercely can be.” (assessing the founder and head of Salomon’s legendary bond trading Arbitrage Group, John 
Meriwether); LOWENSTEIN, supra note 55 at 76-77 (describing the feelings and emotional toll on some principals of 
the hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, during its mounting losses in September 1998). 
78 Mark Hulbert, Forget About Efficient Markets, Let the Sun Shine In, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2001 at C7 (reporting 
on one such study). 
79 Edward M. Saunders, Jr., Losing Stock Prices and Wall Street Weather, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1993).  See 
also W. Kramer & R. Runde, Stocks and the Weather: An Exercise in Data Mining or yet Another Capital Market 
Anomaly, 22 EMPIRICAL ECON. 637 (1997) (replicating Saunder’s study for Frankfurt, Germany); M. A. Trombley, 
Stock Prices and Wall Street Weather: Additional Evidence, 36 QUART. J. BUS. & ECON. 11 (1997) (reexamining 
Saunder’s study).   
80 David A. Hirshleifer & Tyler G. Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the Weather, J. FIN. 
(forthcoming, 2003). 
81 Mark Jack Kamstra, Lisa A. Kramer, & Maurice D. Levi, Losing Sleep at the Market: The Daylight Savings 
Anomaly, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1005 (2000); Michael Dowling & Brian M. Lucey, Weather, Biorhythms and Stock 
Returns: Some Preliminary Irish Evidence (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (same).  




year.82  A different approach studies the relationship between stock returns and temperature.83  
Another study finds that on average, morning stock returns exceed afternoon returns.84    All of 
these studies imply that the moods of individual investors or professional market-makers affect 
stock prices.85  In addition, there is empirical evidence that unusually high levels of geomagnetic 
storms (GMS) have a statistically and economically significant negative impact on world and 
country-specific stock returns, even after controlling for behavioral, environmental, and well-
known market seasonal factors.86  Finally, other studies speculate that there is a lunar cycle, also 
known as the circatrigintan cycle, effect in stock prices whereby stock returns are significantly 
higher on days near a new moon than on days near a full moon.87   
3. A CASE STUDY OF IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE: ON-LINE BROKERAGE ADS 
 
 A case study of irrational exuberance is provided by emotional on-line investing 
advertisements that presented visceral and powerful images of on-line investors getting rich 
quickly. Some individuals exposed to such emotionally appealing on-line brokerage television 
commercials and billboards are likely to ignore or be insensitive to variations in the probability 
                                                          
82 Mark Jack Kamstra, et al., Winter Blues: A SAD Stock Market Cycle, AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming, 2003) 
(providing international evidence of a link between seasonal depression and seasonal variation in stock returns). 
83 Melanie Cao & Jason Wei, Stock Market Returns: A Temperature Anomaly (Aug. 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author) (finding stock prices are negatively correlated with temperature). 
84 Lisa A. Kramer, Intraday Stock Returns, Time-varying Risk Premia, and Diurnal Mood Variation (Apr. 2001) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (finding overall broad support for mood changes affecting risk 
premia and intraday returns). 
85 William N. Goetzmann & Ning Zhu, Rain or Shine: Where is the Weather Effect? National Bureau Econ. Res. 
Working Paper No. 9465 (unpublished manuscript, Jan. 2003) (replicating the above weather effect in stock prices, 
but suggesting that such an effect is due to weather-induced mood changes of NYSE specialists, not of individual 
investors). 
86 Anna Krivelyova & Cesare Robotti, Playing the Field: Where Geomagnetic Storms and International Stock 
Markets (unpublished manuscript, Feb. 21, 2003) (documenting such evidence and relating those results to 
psychological theories of misattribution of mood). 
87 Ilia D. Dichev & Troy D. James, Lunar Cycle Effects in Stock Returns (Aug. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the author) (finding a pervasive pattern of returns in the 15 days around new moon dates being double the 
returns in the 15 days around full moon dates, for all major U.S. stock indexes over the last 100 years and for nearly 
all major stock indexes of 24 other countries over the last 30 years); Kathy Yuan, et al., Are Investors Moonstruck?  
Lunar Phases and Stock Returns (Sept. 5, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (finding strong 




of striking it rich.  Some on-line traders will focus instead on the outcome of becoming rich. 
Television commercials by on-line securities brokerages not only emphasized the personal 
control, ease, and profitability of such trading, but also were rich in emotional imagery.  
 Professors Barber, Elsbach, and Odean performed a content analysis of five hundred 
television commercials from thirteen brokerages.88  They found that 28% of all commercials 
between 1990 and 2000 depicted images and messages likely to induce good or positive moods 
in viewers and the percentage of such commercials more than doubled from 12.39 percent in 
1990-1995 to 32.98 percent in 1996-2000.89  This empirical finding is consistent with and 
understandable in light of recent psychological experiments demonstrating that people in 
moderately good or positive moods tend to be less thorough and less vigilant decision-makers, 
are more subject to cognitive biases, and rely more on heuristics than people in moderately 
negative moods.90  On-line brokerages voluntarily ceased the broadcasting of positive emotional 
commercials due to changes in financial market conditions and moods. 
A Discover Brokerage Direct television commercial about on-line trading depicted a 
conversation between a passenger and a stock-trading tow truck driver, who states, “That’s my 
home.  Looks more like an island.  Technically, it’s a country.”91  Other television commercials 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
evidence across forty eight countries that stock returns on days near a new moon are higher than on days near a full 
moon). 
88 Brad M. Barber, et al., Investing Advice From Television Commercials, prepared for the A.A.R.P.-Public Policy 
Institute (Nov. 24, 2001).  
89 Id. at 16, 25 tbl.1, 27 fig.1b. 
90 Kimberly D. Elsbach & Pamela S. Barr, The Effects of Mood on Individuals’ Use of Structured Decision 
Protocols, 10 ORG. SCI. 181, 185-94 (1999); Norman Schwarz et al., Mood and Persuasion: Affective States 
Influence the Processing of Persuasive Communications, 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 187, 
189 (1991); Herbert Bliss et al., Mood and Stereotyping: Affective States and the Use of General Knowledge 
Structures, 7 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 63, 67- 74 (1996). 
91 Office of the New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer: From Wall Street to Web Street: A Report on the 
Problems and Promise of the On-line Brokerage Industry Prepared by Investor Protection Internet Bureau and 
Securities Bureau, 1189 PLI/Corp 355, 395 (1999) [hereinafter From Wall Street to Web Street], available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/investors/1999_on-line_brokers/brokers.html. 




included a stock-trading teenager, who owned his own helicopter.92 A series of Schwab 
commercials featured such celebrities as teen-age Russian tennis star Anna Kournikova.93  An 
E*TRADE advertisement claimed “that on-line investing is ‘A cinch. A snap. A piece of 
cake.’”94     
A commentator noted that: 
The years prior to 2000 featured a collection of e-trading commercials that could 
be viewed as hilarious by the seasoned professional and convincing by the novice 
trader.  A typical commercial began by showing a teen-age boy or an elderly 
woman who appear to be very ordinary, and are treated as such.  In the next 
scene, the other characters, and no doubt the viewers, are surprised to find out that 
this person is being thanked for bailing out a country, for example.  The strong 
suggestion is that anyone who has a modest savings account can acquire a fortune, 
and be treated accordingly, if only they start trading on the Internet.  For any 
skeptical viewers having their doubts, a resumption of the news, particularly the 
business news cable stations, would often turn to factual stories of the day’s new 
IPO billionaires.95      
 
These commercials clearly conjured up mental images of becoming rich quickly and 
easily.  Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt said, “Quite frankly, some advertisements more 
closely resemble commercials for the lottery than anything else.  When firms, again and again, 
tell investors that on-line investing can make them rich, it creates unrealistic expectations. … 
                                                          
92 Joseph Kahn, On-line Brokerages Use Advertising in a Battle for New Customers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/10/biztech/articles/04trad.html. 
93 Id. 
94 JOHN R. NOFSINGER, INVESTMENT MADNESS: HOW PSYCHOLOGY AFFECTS YOUR INVESTING … AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 129 (2001). 




[M]any investors are susceptible to quixotic euphoria… .”96  New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer observed that on-line brokerage ads “conveys a message of convenience, speed, easy 
wealth, and the risk of ‘being left behind’ in the on-line era.”97   
 Like much advertising, these advertisements do not provide information for viewers to 
process cognitively, as much as they appeal to viewers’ emotions.98  These commercials were 
directed at evoking strong positive mental imagery and favorable emotional reactions to on-line 
investing risks. Such on-line brokerage ads decreased significantly after the bull market ended, 
further suggesting that the goals of such commercials were primarily to complement an overall 
mood of irrational exuberance and euphoria that prevailed then in securities markets and to stir 
up such emotions as hope and greed.99  In a Jan. 26, 2001 report about on-line trading, the SEC 
expressed concerns that certain types of aggressive on-line brokerage ads may cause investors to 
possess unrealistic expectations over the risks and rewards of investing.100  In that report, the 
SEC noted that “[a]dvertising that contains misrepresentations or omissions of material fact may 
violate the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”101 In 2000 and 2001, the SEC and 
NASD (National Association of Securities Dealers) formally investigated the advertising 
practices of E*Trade Group, Inc.102 But, both lengthy investigations resulted in the SEC 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
95 Gunduz Caginalp, The Real Year 2000 Problem: Investor Psychology, 2 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MARKETS 2, 3-4 
(2001). 
96 Arthur Levitt, Plain Talk About On-line Investing, Speech at the National Press Club (May 4, 1999); see also 
Report of NASDR Concerning the Advertisement of On-line Brokerages (Sept. 21, 1999). 
97 From Wall Street to Web Street, supra note 91, at 4.  
98 Julie A. Edell & Marian Chapman Burke, The Power of Feelings in Understanding Advertising Effects, 14 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 421, 431 (1987). 
99 Lisa Singhania, Downturn Brings Changes to On-line Brokerage Sector: Firms Cut Back on Pricey Ads, Expand 
Services, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2001. 
100 SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Examinations of Broker-Dealers Offering On-line 
Trading: Summary of Findings and Recommendations 1 (Jan. 26, 2001). 
101 Id. at n.14; NASD Rule 2210(d); NYSE Rules 472.30 and 472.40. 
102 On-line Investor Complaint Center, U.S. Securities Regulators Criticize, Warn On-line Brokers – Yet Again (Feb. 
26, 2001). 




dropping its fair disclosure case and the NASD settling with E*Trade.103  The SEC did not 
publicly state the reasons for its decision to drop the case.  Although there is little concern over 
such types of advertisements in the current anxious securities market environment, similar 
advertisements may return when an exuberant securities market environment does.  In addition, 
there may be cause for concern over advertisements that exploit investor anxiety in a bear 
market.104  Furthermore, SEC releases already express concern over the advertising of such 
complex financial instruments as collateralized mortgage obligations.  For example, 
(c)(2) Advertisements concerning collateralized mortgage obligations, 
advertisements concerning security futures, and advertisements and sales 
literature concerning registered investment companies (including mutual funds, 
variable contracts and unit investment trusts) that include or incorporate rankings 
or comparisons of the investment company with other investment companies 
where the ranking or comparison category is not generally published or is the 
creation, either directly or indirectly, of the investment company, its underwriter 
or an affiliate, shall be filed with the Department for review at least 10 days prior 
to use (or such shorter period as the Department may allow in particular 
circumstances) for approval and, if changed by the Association, shall be withheld 
from publication or circulation until any changes specified by the Association 
have been made or, if expressly disapproved, until the advertisement has been 
refiled for, and has received, Association approval. The member must provide 
                                                          
103 CNNfn, E*Trade Ad Probe Near End (June 27, 2001), available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2001/06/27/companies/etrade/; Michael Schroeder, NASD to Settle Its Ad Dispute With 
E*Trade, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2001 at C1. 
104 Jane L. Levere, An Online Bank Has A Message for Skittish Investors: Consider A Savings Account, N.Y. TIMES, 
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HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1462-66 (1999) (discussing fear-based advertising). 




with each filing the actual or anticipated date of first use. Any member filing any 
investment company advertisement or sales literature pursuant to this paragraph 
shall include a copy of the data, ranking or comparison on which the ranking or 
comparison is based.105 
 SROs (Self Regulating Organizations), such as the NASD, also have approval and 
recordkeeping rules related to complex financial instruments.  Also, relevant for whether and 
how the SEC should regulate such advertisements are Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
deceptive advertising cases106 and the FTC’s Policy Statement on Deception.107  Finally, of 
relevance are the literatures on consumer psychology in general,108 and the marketing power of 
emotions in particular.109  
 There are many other securities areas where investing is more likely to be driven by 
emotional reactions to rather than cognitive processing of financial risks and information.  The 
analysis of this chapter applies to such areas for drawing legal policy implications that differ 
                                                          
105 SEC Release No. 34-46186, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1792, July 11, 2002, *17-19. 
106 See, e.g., Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (C.A.2 1910) (stating that “[t]he law is not made 
for experts but to protect the public,-- that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the 
credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general 
impressions”); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942) (stating “the buying public does not ordinarily 
carefully study or weigh each word in an advertisement” and that “[a]dvertisements are intended not ‘to be carefully 
dissected with a dictionary at hand, but rather to produce an impression upon’ prospective purchasers” (quoting 
Newton Tea & Spice Co. v. United States, 288 F. 475, 479 (6th Cir. 1923))); Standard Oil Co. of California v. FTC, 
577 F.2d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating “that commercial messages might lead the average viewer, in his anxiety 
…, to overreact even though upon careful reflection he might see for himself the limitations inherent in the 
advertiser's claim”). 
107 An advertisement is deceptive when there is “a misrepresentation, omission or other practice, that misleads the 
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”  Policy Statement on Deception, 4 
Trade Reg. Rep (CCH) ¶13, 205 at 20, 917 (FTC Oct. 14, 1983).  In determining if an advertisement deceives 
consumers, the FTC asks what does the advertisement say or imply, and does the advertisement have a reasonable 
basis for its claims? 
108 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 104, at 1428-1528 (presenting empirical marketing evidence and consumer 
behavioral studies of companies manipulating consumer perceptions of risk); Jacob Jacoby, Is it Rational to Assume 
Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer Psychological Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 81 n.1 (2000) (citing extensive empirical advertising, consumer behavior, and marketing 
research about consumer psychology). 
109 See, e.g., generally JOHN O’SHAGHNESSY & NICHOLAS JACKSON O’SHAUGHNESSY, THE MARKETING POWER OF 
EMOTIONS (2003) (providing a systematic account of the significant role that emotions play in marketing and 
consumer decision-making and shopping experiences). 




from those based on unemotional investing.  One such area is day trading,110 and emotional 
advertisements for day trading.111  Financial scams by con artists are another such area.112  
Examples of such financial scams are so-called “prime bank programs,” which promise 
incredible returns from investing in “prime bank” securities.113  Another example of such a 
financial scam is that of so-called affinity fraud, which is targeted at members of such 
identifiable groups as ethnic minorities and religious groups.114 
B. THEORETICAL MODELS  
Neoclassical economic theory already incorporates certain emotions in several ways.  
First, love or hate can be treated as part of an individual’s tastes or non-monetary utility in the 
sense of interdependent individual preferences.115 Second, certain emotional reactions function 
as commitment devices in multi-person decision environments.116  Third, game theory can 
                                                          
110 Rebecca Buckman, Gambling Man: Stock Losses Roiled A Volatile Personality, And Slaughter Ensued, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 2, 1999 at A1 (reporting on Mark Barton, a day trader who snapped and went on a killing rampage); 
Evan Thomas & Trent Gregax, It's a Bad Trading Day ...And It's About to Get Worse, NEWSWEEK 22 Aug. 9, 1999 
(same); Rebecca Buckman & Ruth Simon, Day Trading Can Breed Perilous Illusions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1999 at 
C1 (reporting on the psychology of day traders and that “[m]ost amateurs can't ‘clinically distance themselves 
emotionally from the decisions they make in the market.’”). 
111 Anjali Arora & Jamie Reno, Rolling the Dice With a Click of the Mouse: Day Trading is a Seductive but Tricky 
Game, a Subculture in Which Traders Find That Risks are High and Profits Elusive, NEWSWEEK 30 Aug. 9, 1999 
(reporting on affective day trading advertisements and a settlement over deceptive marketing and violations of 
Massachusetts state securities laws by All-Tech Investment Group, a day-trading firm); Susanne Craig, Regulators 
Zap Day-Trading Guru Houtkin and All-Tech, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2001 at C1 (reporting on an NASD 
administrative action against All-Tech Direct Inc., one of the nations’ largest day-trading firms, for misleading 
statements in advertisements in print, on radio, and on the Internet about how easy it is to profit by day trading). 
112 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28, at 166-78 (describing how con artists utilize affect in succeeding at financial 
scams). 
113 SEC, How Prime Bank Fraud Works, available at 
 http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/primebank/howtheywork.shtml. 
114 SEC, Investor Alert: Affinity Fraud: How To Avoid Investment Scams That Target Groups, Mar. 16, 2001, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/affinity.htm. 
115 GARY BECKER, Spouses and Beggars: Love and Sympathy, in ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 231-37 (1996) 
(proposing formal analytical models of emotions in terms of interdependent utility functions). 
116 ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988) (explaining that 
certain emotional dispositions could have been selected in humans for their survival value in strategic interactions); 
Jack Hirshleifer, On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises, in THE LATEST ON THE BEST: ESSAYS IN 
EVOLUTION AND OPTIMALITY 307, 311-21 (John Dupré ed., 1987) (providing formal analytical models of the 
strategic value of certain emotions).  But see Paul M. Romer, Thinking and Feeling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 439, 441-43 
(2000) (observing that some feelings may induce actions that actually reduce one’s reproductive success when 
facing novel situations).  




accommodate emotions that depend on probability beliefs about strategic behavior.117   Recently, 
several economists have urged their fellow economists to study emotions more in their 
models.118  A survey of how economic theory views emotions illustrates this renewed interest.119  
That survey, however, criticized the interpretation of emotions as psychic benefits and costs or as 
merely a source of preferences because such interpretations ignore how emotions affect the 
ability to make rational choices.120  This chapter addresses this criticism by explicitly analyzing 
irrational exuberance and anxiety in securities investing. 
1. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY AND ANTICIPATORY FEELINGS 
 
A new economic framework introduces a general psychological expected utility model 
that includes anticipatory feelings prior to the resolution of risk.  This model extends the 
neoclassical expected utility model to incorporate a quite general class of anticipatory feelings, 
such as anxiety and suspense.121  This model shows how anticipatory feelings can result in time 
inconsistency because as time passes, anticipatory feelings and preferences may change.  This 
model has applications to anticipatory pleasure or savoring and implies a resulting preference for 
commitment devices to facilitate planning and overcome intertemporal inconsistency.122  
Applying this model to suspense and gambling yields the empirically supported prediction that 
                                                          
117 John D. Geanakoplos et al., Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 60, 65, 
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120 Id. at 73 (1998) (criticizing a psychic cost benefit model of emotions). 
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people will bet on their emotional favorites in a sporting event.123  This model is also rich enough 
to analyze preferences over illusions and the dilemma that a doctor faces about whether to give 
her patient (more than legally required) detailed information concerning an upcoming medically 
benign, but subjectively threatening diagnostic surgical procedure. 124  Furthermore, this model 
has policy implications for the provision to the public of payoff-relevant information by the 
Federal Reserve and other government agencies.125  Finally, this model supports 
recommendations for “psychologically-appropriate” formats of disseminating medical 
information to the general population and providing medical advice to specific patients at risk of 
diabetes or breast cancer.126 
Applying this model to focus on the portfolio decisions of anxious investors demonstrates 
that a security producing anxiety on the part of its owners commands a lower price and a higher 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
122 Id. at 72-73. 
123 Id. at 73. 
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clinical breast examinations and reduced adherence to monthly breast self-examination); Lawrence E. Klusman, 
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required rate of return than if that security did not cause its owners to experience anxiety.127  This 
model also formally demonstrates that the price of a riskless security is greater than it would be 
in a world in which investors do not experience anxiety because riskless securities provide the 
benefit of anxiety reduction.128  This model proves that “anxiety will reduce the price of stocks 
and increase their return relative to the standard [unemotional] model” and that “stock ownership 
entails psychic costs [because stockholders have] to live with the anxiety that accompanies the 
holding of a risky portfolio.”129  Finally, this model explains how the desire to avoid the stress 
and anxiety associated with retirement planning can result in people avoiding thinking about, let 
alone planning for, their retirement until it is too late to avoid anymore.130  Such irrational 
anxiety has very disturbing implications for the social desirability of recent proposals to privatize 
social security and retirement investment decisions. 
Finally, a recent general equilibrium model provides theoretical support for the 
proposition that feelings affect securities prices.131  This model argues that investors’ feelings 
have an effect on stock prices if three conditions are satisfied.132  First, investors do not realize 
their investment decisions are influenced by fluctuations in their moods.  Second, investors’ 
subjective parameters, such as their judgments of the appropriate discount factor or their levels 
of relative risk aversion, fluctuate in response to fluctuations in their moods over time.  Third, 
investors uniformly and widely experience the impacts of such fluctuations in their moods on 
their subjective parameters.  This model has closed-form solutions for equilibrium stock 
                                                          
127 Caplin & Leahy, supra note 121, at 68. 
128 Id. at 68. 
129 Id. at 69. 
130 Id. at 72. 
131 Rajnish Mehra & Raaj Sah, Mood Fluctuations, Projection Bias, and Volatility of Equity Prices, 26 J. ECON. 
DYNAMICS & CONTROL 869 (2002). 
132 Id. at 870. 




prices.133  The model predicts that, all by itself, a 0.10 percent fluctuation in the beliefs of 
investors regarding the discount factor can generate a 3-4 percent standard deviation in stock 
prices.134  The model also finds a similarly important, but smaller effect on the standard 
deviation of stock prices due to a fluctuation in risk attitudes.135 
2. THE RISK-AS-FEELINGS HYPOTHESIS 
 
 A new theory about decision making under risk, namely the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, 
focuses on the role of emotions that decision-makers experience leading up to and including the 
moment of decision making.136  The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is based upon four well-
supported premises.  First, emotions can arise without any cognitive antecedents.  Second, there 
are emotional reactions to cognitive evaluations.  Third, emotions inform cognitive evaluations.  
Fourth, emotions play a crucial role in affecting behavior.     
 Emotional reactions to and cognitive evaluations of risk and information differ for two 
reasons.  First, emotions respond to probabilities and outcomes in systematically different ways 
than how cognitive evaluations of risk depend on probabilities and outcomes.  A fundamental 
difference between emotional reactions to risk and cognitive evaluations of risk is that 
anticipatory emotions are insensitive to changes in probability for a wide range of probability 
values.137  Expected utility depends linearly and symmetrically on the probabilities and utilities 
of outcomes.  Variations in probability generate corresponding variations in expected utility, 
holding the utility of outcomes constant. Under prospect theory, cognitive evaluations of risk 
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depend linearly and symmetrically on the probability weighting functions and subjective 
valuations of outcomes.  Variations in probability generate corresponding variations in 
probability weighting functions, holding the subjective valuations of outcomes constant.  In 
contrast, probability plays a relatively minor role in such anticipatory emotions as irrational 
exuberance and anxiety.   
 If potential outcomes have a lot of emotional resonance, such as (perhaps) kisses from 
your favorite movie star or electric shocks, then their attractiveness or unattractiveness are 
incredibly insensitive to changes in the probability of that outcome, even if that probability drops 
from 99% to 1%.138  For positive outcomes, any departure from certainty induces fear, while any 
deviation from impossibility produces hope.  For negative outcomes, any departure from 
certainty produces hope, while any deviation from impossibility induces fear.    
 Second, other causal factors besides probabilities and outcomes influence anticipatory 
emotions.  The risk-as-feelings hypothesis focuses on several emotional factors as having a 
predictable influence on decision-making.  These factors include the vividness of the 
associations that risks evoke; the time-path of the decision process; and how evolutionarily 
prepared individuals are for certain emotional reactions.  For the purposes of understanding 
irrational exuberance and anxiety in securities investing, there are two such important 
determinants, namely imagery and misattribution.  An analysis of the phenomenon of 
misattribution is contained in the next section on the related affect heuristic. 
 Another account of why anticipatory emotions display probability neglect is that 
anticipatory emotions are primarily due to mental images of the outcome of a decision.  Such 
images are discrete and so are not much affected by probabilities.  Thus, anticipatory emotions 
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that arise from such images will be insensitive to changes in probability.  An investor’s mental 
image of what it will be like to participate in an IPO of stock is likely to be approximately the 
same whether the probability of that stock skyrocketing is 1 in 100,000 or 1 in 100,000,000.  In 
contrast, an investor’s mental image of what it will be like to participate in a stock IPO that 
skyrockets will likely be very different from that investor’s mental image of what it will be like 
to participate in a stock IPO that only has a very modest increase.   
3. THE “HOW-DO-I-FEEL-ABOUT-IT” HEURISTIC 
 
Experimental results and clinical phenomena demonstrate that emotional reactions are 
fairly independent of, often impervious to, and precede in time, cognitive judgments.139  
Evolutionary forces may explain why affect precedes cognition.140 A recent study found that 
“affective processes play a critical role in determining choices and that these affective processes 
may sometimes influence choice without the decision maker’s awareness.”141  A large body of 
empirical psychological research finds that affective impressions attach to images and those 
affective impressions influence judgments and decisions.142 
A recent theoretical framework emphasizes the importance of an affect or “how-do-I-
feel-about-it” heuristic in guiding decisions and judgments.143  People utilize this heuristic when 
                                                          
139 Robert B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 151, 158-65 (1980) 
(providing and discussing such evidence); Robert B. Zajonc, On the Primacy of Affect, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 117, 118-
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they come to have an emotional, all-things-considered, reaction to make judgments. People 
utilizing this heuristic essentially ask “how-do-I-feel-about-something” and utilize their answer 
as the basis for making their judgment about something.144 
The affect or how-do-I-feel-about-it” heuristic is related to the mood-as-information 
hypothesis.  This hypothesis argues that people’s moods informs their decisions, even when the 
causes of those moods are unrelated to their decisions.  This phenomenon is known as 
misattribution.  It explains how and why nominally irrelevant feelings or what the famous 
macroeconomist, Keynes called “animal spirits” influence securities investing.145 
The “how-do-I-feel-about-it” heuristic explains public concerns about health and 
environmental risks, high punitive damage awards, and people’s reactions to contested political 
events.146 The “how-do-I-feel-about-it” heuristic is related to the dual process theory that people 
process information via two parallel, interactive modes.147  The first is a rational, deliberative, 
and analytical system employing such rules of logic and evidence as probability theory.  The 
second is an experiential system that encodes reality in terms of images, metaphors, and 
narratives that are imbued with affect and feelings.  There is much experimental evidence that a 
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person’s mood influences which of these two information-processing strategies a person 
utilizes.148   
The Affect Infusion Model (AIM) argues that the extent to which people rely on their 
feelings to make decisions depends on how abstract, risky, and uncertain those decisions are.149  
Usually, people who are in rationality utilize high affect infusion strategies (HAIS) in highly 
complex decisions, such as securities investing.  Emotions form a major input of decisions made 
via HAIS.  People usually employ low affect infusion strategies (LAIS) in decisions requiring 
“little generative constructive processing.”150  So, LAIS are more appropriate for decisions that 
are familiar and low in complexity than for decisions that are infrequent and high in complexity.            
II. MANDATORY SECURITIES DISCLOSURES  
  
 “Mandatory disclosure is a – if not the - defining characteristic of U.S. securities 
regulation.”151  The Supreme Court stated that the “fundamental purpose” of federal securities 
regulations “was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor 
… .”152  In another famous case, the Supreme Court stated the Securities Act of 1933 and its 
mandatory disclosure requirements were designed “to protect investors by promoting full 
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions.”153  Investor 
protection is clearly a fundamental goal of U.S. securities regulation. In fact, upon clicking on 
“What We Do” under the heading “About the SEC” on the SEC’s home page, one learns that 
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“[t]he primary mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to protect 
investors.”154   
There is a long-standing debate over the purpose and effectiveness of mandatory 
securities disclosure.155  An often-cited purpose is to improve the informational efficiency of 
securities prices.156  Critics of this accuracy enhancement efficiency justification argue that 
mandatory securities disclosure has not achieved this purpose.157  Professor Mahoney proposes 
as an alternative efficiency justification for mandatory securities disclosure reducing the agency 
costs that arise between investors and promoters and between corporate managers and their 
shareholders.158  Both of these justifications of mandatory securities disclosures focus on the 
cognitive impacts of increased disclosures. 
Mandatory disclosures generate not only information, but also such emotions as perhaps 
anxiety, embarrassment, euphoria, exuberance, feeling stupid, relief, or shame.  For example, 
mandating disclosure of the realistically very low odds of winning a lottery and the present 
discounted value of the after-tax prize winnings produces no benefits if such disclosures fail to 
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reduce the number of lottery ticket buyers, but cause lottery players to feel dumb or foolish and 
reduce their pleasure from daydreaming about possible future riches.  Such emotional 
consequences of mandatory disclosure can alter behavior.  For example, the display by retailers 
of detailed facts about food content mandated by food labeling acts may result in the so-called 
“Snackwell Effect,” named for the fat-free cookie that appears to lead to greater consumption.159  
Emotional reactions to securities risks imply emotional reactions to securities information 
because information is in essence the negative of risk as information involves the reduction of 
risk.  Analogous to fear in the investment context, evaluating strategies for combating terrorism 
depends on how much fear involves misperception about risk, whether fear is a hedonic loss that 
should count as being a cost or harm under a cost-benefit analysis, and to what extent fear is 
contagious.160  The fact that people feel emotions and would like to minimize anxiety also has 
novel implications for health and medical regulatory policy.161 
Questions about how much and precisely what disclosures federal securities laws should 
require are analogous to recent questions about how much and precisely what disclosures the 
federal government should issue about possible terrorist attacks.  While non-specific disclosures 
provide information, they also produce anxiety, fear, and general uneasiness.  There is also the 
                                                          
159 See Catherine Censor Shemo, Fake Fats, Real Threat, VEGETARIAN TIMES, Feb. 1997, at 20 (reporting on the 
impact on dieters being lulled into a false sense of confidence by misunderstanding food labeling information).   
160 Eric A. Posner, Fear and the Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 684-89 
(2002) (discussing these three aspects of fear and their implications for dealing with terrorist risks). 
161 Paul Slovic, Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The Influence of Affect on Judgment and Decision-Making, 6 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 166-200 (2000) (describing recent empirical and theoretical findings proving the 
importance of affect and experiential thinking on decisions and judgment and the implications of those studies for 
legal policy towards cigarette smoking). See also Jay Katz, Informed Consent -- Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69, 87 (1993) (observing that emotions influence patients’ decisions and their 
autonomy); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 142-50 (1984) (analogizing emotional 
tensions of the physician-patient relationship to those of the analyst-patient relationship); Peter H. Schuck, 
Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 903, 926-27, 942 (1994) (discussing an idealistic vision of 
informed consent focusing on patients’ emotional needs, arguing that physician-patient relationships involve 
emotional attachment and vulnerability, pointing out how the complex emotional nature of physician-patient 
relationships can lead to conflicts, and stressing that an important cost of providing information to patients is the 
emotional stress patients experience in attempting to comprehend such information). 




danger that over time people become desensitized to many non-specific disclosures, so that a 
more specific disclosure may fall on deaf ears. Broad and general disclosures also lack the 
vividness of more specific and narrowly focused disclosures.   
Securities disclosures function not only as information and marketing documents, but 
also as protection from civil liability for securities fraud.  Even though there is no analogous 
marketing role for disclosures about possible terrorist attacks; after Sept. 11, 2001, the U.S. 
federal government is concerned with a severe public relations penalty for non-disclosures about 
possible terrorist attacks that is analogous to liability for fraudulent securities non-disclosures.  
Another difference between securities disclosures and disclosures about potential terrorist attacks 
is their actual or intended audience. Some legal scholars believe and argue that the investing 
public is neither the actual nor intended audience for the disclosures that federal securities laws 
mandate.162  Instead, these commentators feel that professional analysts are the audience of much 
of the accounting and financial disclosures that federal securities regulations mandate. 
Professional analysts filter that information onto the investing public.163  Because analysts are 
professionals who have repeated experience at interpreting such disclosures, they may seem less 
likely than inexperienced and unsophisticated individuals to feel irrational exuberance and 
anxiety as the result of securities disclosures.164  But, precisely because of their experience with 
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other similar securities in the past, professional analysts may have more vivid reactions to 
securities disclosures than laypersons lacking any personal or direct knowledge of similar cases.  
Because of their compensation, there may also be serious conflicts of interests between 
professional analysts and the investing public that mean analysts could routinely make 
unjustifiably optimistic or irrationally exuberant securities recommendations.165  
The debate over mandatory disclosure in federal securities regulation ignores the 
emotional benefits or costs of such disclosures, in particular, irrational exuberance and anxiety 
that potential and existing investors may feel due to disclosures or their absence.  Such emotional 
benefits or costs affect both individuals in terms of increased or reduced social utility and issuers 
of securities in terms of a lower or higher cost of capital due to such emotional reactions.  The 
heterogeneity of people’s emotional reactions to mandatory securities disclosures complicates if 
and how securities regulations should take irrational exuberance and anxiety into account.  The 
extent to which different people feel irrational exuberance and anxiety from securities 
disclosures affects the socially optimal amount of those disclosures.  Even holding the content of 
disclosed information fixed, anxiety has implications for the form or presentation of that 
information. 
Because irrational exuberance and anxiety depends more on the possibility than on the 
probability of certain outcomes, some people may overreact in their securities investments to 
disclosures about material events with positive, but small probabilities of occurrence.  Irrational 
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exuberance and anxiety may also cause individuals to avoid acquiring or processing material 
information and to avoid thinking carefully about certain financial outcomes.  Even if the 
apocryphal widows and orphans feel irrational exuberance and anxiety, some financial and legal 
scholars believe that equilibrium securities market prices may accurately reflect all relevant 
material information if analysts and institutional investors do not experience irrational 
exuberance and anxiety.166  But, even were securities professionals and institutions to be immune 
from irrational exuberance and anxiety, limited arbitrage prevents them from eliminating the 
impact of those investors who do feel irrational exuberance and anxiety on securities prices. 
On the other hand, just as disclosure of information may trigger irrational exuberance and 
anxiety, lack of disclosure may also trigger fear of the unknown (or a false sense of contentment 
from limited knowledge) and fear over imagined worst case scenarios (or joy over imagined best 
case scenarios) .  Lack of mandated disclosures does not mean lack of irrational exuberance and 
anxiety because there are many other sources of information or noise besides mandated 
disclosures, including security analysts, friends, family members, colleagues, investment clubs, 
and internet chat rooms.167  Thus, there is a countervailing emotional benefit from disclosure, 
namely the prevention of irrational exuberance and anxiety that would result from lack of 
disclosure.168 
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The above observation helps to explain why some people react with irrational anxiety 
over companies not expensing stock options utilized to compensate and provide incentives for 
their executives.169  Not knowing how much those stock options actually cost a company may 
lead both existing and potential investors to overestimate the cost of granting such executive 
stock options and experience irrational anxiety from such overestimates or from just not 
knowing.  On the other side of the emotional spectrum from irrational anxiety due to lack of 
disclosure is possible irrational exuberance or unjustified excitement.  In the case of the bull 
market of the late 1990’s, many investors evaluated companies in the so-called “new economy” 
based more on irrational exuberance and irrational euphoria than on fundamental analysis.  
The key legal policy questions are thus what can and should we do about irrational 
exuberance and anxiety.170  The Brady Commission formed to examine the 1987 stock market 
crash advocated circuit breakers to “cushion the impact of market movements, which would 
otherwise damage market infrastructures.”171  In 1988, U.S. securities exchanges adopted trading 
halts to essentially provide investors a cooling-off period if the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
index fell too much too fast.172 Symmetrically, reverse circuit breakers could mandate trading 
halts for overall securities markets or individual securities if securities price indices or individual 
securities prices rise too quickly.173  But, experimental studies find not only are circuit breakers 
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ineffectual, but also that mandated market closures accelerate trading activity.174 Another 
experiment finds that circuit breakers do not work to retard bubbles, but instead they actually 
somewhat exacerbate bubbles for inexperienced subjects.175   
Instead of circuit breakers, the SEC can require greater firm-specific disclosures that 
detail how a particular firm’s securities differ from the overall securities markets.  Section 13(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act provides the SEC with authority to require Securities Exchange 
Act registered companies to file such information and documents as it deems to be in the public 
interest.176  Such additional firm-specific disclosures could be provided in the form of “public 
reports explicitly addressing the relationship between their earnings, dividends, and prevailing 
stock prices and perhaps containing management commentary upon the wisdom of this 
relationship and how long it might be expected to be sustained.”177  But, such mandatory 
disclosures presume that individuals can and will cognitively evaluate such disclosures as 
opposed to increase noise trading.178  If one believes that individuals should be holding broadly 
diversified portfolios instead of engaging in dubious individual stock picking, then individuals 
do not require firm-specific information.  If one believes that irrational exuberance and anxiety 
dominate securities investing, then mandatory disclosure which is the linchpin of U.S. federal 
securities regulation may have unexpected emotional, if not little or no, effects upon investing. 
Answering the questions of whether, what and how much of mandatory securities 
disclosures are socially desirable requires comparing the unemotional and emotional 
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consequences of such disclosures with the unemotional and emotional consequences of voluntary 
securities market disclosures.  An emotional cost-benefit analysis differs from the unemotional 
considerations raised in the past and current debate over mandatory securities disclosures. The 
relative size of the emotional costs and benefits of mandatory securities disclosures versus the 
emotional costs and benefits of voluntary securities disclosures will vary depending on the 
precise nature of the specific disclosures involved. 
Finally, there is another set of actors in securities regulation who are subject to irrational 
exuberance and anxiety, namely the securities regulators themselves, be they SEC 
Commissioners; SEC staff; lawyers and other professionals at SROs, such as the NYSE or the 
NASD; members of Congress and their Congressional staff; state attorney generals and their 
staff; private litigants and plaintiffs’ attorneys; issuers and their counsel; judges; or juries.  
Certainly, investors do not have a monopoly on feeling irrational exuberance and anxiety.  A 
central message of this chapter is that emotions are ubiquitous and not always necessarily defects 
in or flaws of human decision-making.  Just as (securities) regulators are no less prone to 
cognitive biases and heuristics than investors are,179 so too (securities) regulators are no less 
prone to irrational exuberance and anxiety than investors are prone to irrational exuberance and 
anxiety.  Just as behavioral explanations of securities regulations complement and enrich public 
choice accounts,180 so too for emotional regulatory stories.   
It is perhaps no surprise that emotional regulating not only happens, but also 
systematically differs from unemotional regulating.  The social desirability of emotional 
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regulating, including but not limited to zealous advocates, passionate public servants, possibly 
envious or sympathetic regulators, and ideologically fanatical prosecutors, is a difficult question.  
But, whether or not emotional regulating is socially desirable, it not only exists, but also is likely 
to continue.  In light of the realities of emotional regulating, the SEC in general and its 
mandatory disclosure regime in particular might do more harm than good and yet persist due to 
emotional appeal, rationales, and considerations.  The history of U.S. federal securities 
regulation from its very inception in the aftermath of the Great Depression to its most recent 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the aftermath of Enron, Arthur Anderson, Rite Aid, Worldcom, Tyco, 
Adelphia, Merck, and Global Crossing is that of (possibly benign) neglect of securities markets 
interrupted by legislation in response to political and public pressure arising from highly visceral 
and public episodes of banking, corporate, or securities fraud and scandals.181  Mandatory 
disclosure might be at best, an impotent, and at worst, a socially harmful regulatory policy if the 
majority of investors experience cognitive biases and utilize heuristics in the processing of 
information and/or feel irrational exuberance and anxiety before and during their investing 
process.  But, the SEC’s obsession with mandatory disclosure may be due to its emotional 
resonance with the metaphor of a “level playing field” and the rationale of protecting investors 
from others and possibly themselves. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter analyzed a still growing, but already large body of empirical and 
experimental evidence of and theoretical economic and psychological models supporting the 
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prevalence of irrational exuberance and anxiety. Because the financial and legal implications of 
irrational exuberance and anxiety differ significantly and systematically from those of 
unemotional rational investing, further empirical, psychological, experimental, and theoretical 
financial economic research concerning the applicability, generality, and robustness of irrational 
exuberance and anxiety is crucial. 
An important question for legal policy is to what extent education or experience mitigates 
irrational exuberance and anxiety. After all, not only did many individual and novice investors 
lose money by investing heavily in high-technology and internet stocks during the 1990’s, but so 
did many hedge funds and mutual funds managed by financially sophisticated and experienced 
investors.182  To the extent that individuals are more evolutionarily prepared for certain emotions 
than others, it may be neither easy nor socially desirable to alter irrational exuberance and 
anxiety in response to securities disclosures.183   
Whether more paternalistic securities regulation than our current federal system of 
mandatory disclosure is socially desirable depends on to what extent and how others can improve 
upon the behavior and performance resulting from irrational exuberance and anxiety.184  Indeed, 
if we suspect that most investing is driven by irrational exuberance and anxiety, then securities 
regulation should focus primarily on emotional reactions to, instead of unemotional processing 
of, the form and content of mandatory disclosures.  If we believe that short of explicit and 
                                                          
182 Markus K. Brunnermeier & Stefan Nagel, Arbitrage at its Limits: Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble 
(presenting empirical evidence of limited arbitrage by hedge funds during the NASDAQ technology bubble of 1998-
2000) (Aug. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
183 Loewenstein et al., supra note 136, at 279 (discussing and citing research about evolutionary preparedness for 
certain emotional reactions to risk); Cohen & Dickens, supra note 140 (suggesting evolutionary foundations of 
emotions); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The 
Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 254 (2000) (pointing out evolutionary 
advantages of emotions that promote overreaction to risks); Olsen, supra note 140 (discussing evolutionary reasons 
for the primacy of affect). 
184 For empirical evidence concerning a similar question about consumption decisions, see Joel Waldfogel, Does 
Consumer Irrationality Trump Consumer Sovereignty? Evidence from Gifts and Own Purchases (May 13, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 




outright cognitive fraud; judges, juries and the SEC are not well-equipped to evaluate the likely 
emotional reactions to securities disclosures, then perhaps the SEC should not base federal 
securities regulation upon a philosophy of mandatory disclosure.  But, experts can assist both the 
SEC ex ante and courts ex post in determining the likely emotional reactions to securities 
disclosures or marketing hype by conducting empirical surveys of actual people. 
An intermediate regulatory strategy is to adopt cautiously paternalistic or asymmetrically 
paternalistic regulations, namely regulations which greatly benefit people who are prone to 
mistakes, but only slightly (or not at all) hurt people who are not prone to mistakes.185  It is 
important here as elsewhere to not view all emotional investing as being synonymous with 
making investing errors.  A fundamental lesson of recent economic, neurobiological, and 
psychological research (and hopefully, this chapter) is that emotions sometimes are superior to, 
and sometimes reinforce, but also sometimes work in the opposite direction of unemotional 
reasoning.186  In particular, there are many varieties of emotional investing and some 
complement, while others substitute for unemotional investing.  Determining how much of 
emotional investing is “rational” or “reasonable” is difficult, both for any particular investor and 
for others, such as counterparties (of derivative securities), the SEC, and SROs, such as the 
NASD, NYSE, and AMEX.   
A recent argument proposes not protecting so-called “irrational” investors from 
themselves in order to reap the public good provided by having equilibrium securities market 
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prices reflect the private information of those “irrational” investors.187  But, under a general 
equilibrium analysis, the price impact and survival of “irrational” investors are two related, yet 
quite distinct and independent concepts.188  In other words, in a long-run equilibrium, “irrational” 
investors can have a significant impact on prices whether or not they survive.  Moreover, even if 
“irrational” investors survive, they may have no price impact.  In addition, such a proposal 
assumes the private information of “irrational” investors have high signal to noise ratios.  
Although the signal to noise ratio for emotional investing is difficult to determine in general, 
there are clearly situations where the signal to noise ratio is low.  So, for example, emotional 
investing caused by the on-line brokerage ads described in this chapter is likely to have a low 
signal to noise ratio and therefore regulating such ads is likely to not have any deleterious effect 
on the informational efficiency of securities prices. 
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